Suppose that we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters." The question is, what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? For the problem as stated, a complete characterization was given in Shelah [1], but here we allow voters to abstain. Aside from the trivial case, the possible families of (partial) choice functions break into three cases in terms of the functions that can be generated by majority decision. In one of these, cycles along the lines of Condorcet's paradox are avoided. In another, all partial choice functions can be represented.
Introduction
Condorcet's "paradox" demonstrates that given three candidates A, B, and C, majority rule may result in the society preferring A to B, B to C, and C to A [2] . McGarvey [3] proved a far-reaching extension of Condorcet's paradox: For every asymmetric relation R (so a R b implies b R a) on a set X of n candidates, there are m linear order relations on X: R 1 , . . . , R m , with R as their strict simple majority relation. That is, for every a, b ∈ X, a R b ⇐⇒ |{i : a R i b}| > m 2 .
In other words, given any set of choices from pairs from a set of n candidates, there is a population of m voters, all with simple linear-order preferences among the candidates, who will yield the given outcome for each pair in a majority-rule election between them.
McGarvey's proof gave m = n(n − 1). Stearns [4] found a construction with m = n and noticed that a simple counting argument implies that m must be at least n log n . Erdős and Moser [5] were able to give a construction with m = O n log n . Mala [6] and Alon [7] showed that there is a positive constant c 1 such that, given any asymmetric relation R, there is some m and linear orders R 1 , . . . , R m with a R b ⇐⇒ |{i : a R i b}| > m 2 + c 1 √ m and that this is not true for any c 2 greater than c 1 .
Gil Kalai asked to what extent the assertion of McGarvey's theorem holds if we replace the linear orders by an arbitrary isomorphism class of choice functions on pairs of elements. Namely, when can we guarantee that every asymmetric relation R on X could result from a finite population of voters, each using a given kind of asymmetric relation on X?
Informally, one may think of the situation we study here as follows. Imagine that we have n candidates running for office, and that each voter votes in a two-step process as follows. First, the voter chooses one element from a set of ballot types, which are partial tournaments (or asymmetric relations) with n vertices. Then, having chosen a ballot type, the voter labels the corresponding vertices with the names of the candidates, in such a way that an edge from candidate A to candidate B indicates a preference for A over B (of course, not all ballot types allow one to express one's preferences, but for the purposes of this illustration we assume that each voter does the best he or she can with the available options). The outcome of the election is the partial tournament with a node for each candidate and an edge from A to B if more voters had edges from A to B on their ballots than had the reverse. The question we address here is, what sets of ballot types can generate which partial tournaments via this process, allowing any number of voters? As we shall see, the nontrivial sets of ballot types (or, kinds of symmetric relations, as above) fall into three classes (see Main Claim 3.1 and the last paragraph of this introduction). Among these are the partisan case, in which voters are offered the chance to separate out a preferred subset of the candidates (which is how elections are often run, with the preferred set having size 1). We will show that the partisan case is the only one that does not lead to paradoxical results (i.e., directed cycles). We will also characterize the sets of ballot types which allow every partial tournament to be generated.
More formally, we use the following terminology. Let X k denote the family of subsets of X with k elements:
Either an individual voter's preferences among candidates, or the outcomes that would result from each two-candidate election, may be represented as any of:
• An asymmetric relation R where a R b if and only if a beats b; it is possible that a R b, b R a, and a = b.
• A choice function defined on some subfamily of X 2 , choosing the winner in each pair. Such a choice function is called "full" if its domain is all of X 2 , and "partial" otherwise.
• An oriented graph, i.e. a directed graph with nodes X and edges a → b when a beats b.
We shall treat these representations as largely interchangeable throughout this paper. Total asymmetric relations, full choice functions, and tournaments (complete oriented graphs) all correspond to the case of no abstaining. Using notation from Shelah [1] , we will let Tor(c) denote the oriented graph (i.e., partial tournament) associated with a choice function c. For any set X, c → Tor(c) is a bijection of full choice functions onto tournaments on X, and a bijection of all choice functions onto oriented graphs on X.
For the rest of this paper, we fix a finite set X. We let n (as opposed to n, which is used as a variable) denote the size of X, and assume that n ≥ 3. We let C denote the set of choice functions on pairs from X, that is, the set of functions c : Y → X where Y ⊆ X 2 and c{x, y} ∈ {x, y} for all {x, y} ∈ Y . When c{x, y} is not defined it is interpreted as abstention or having no preference. The main result of Shelah [1] pertained to full choice functions for the voters. It was shown that an arbitrary choice function d could result from a symmetric set C consisting of full choice functions (i.e. for each d there is a finite set {c 1 , . . . , c m } ⊆ C such that d{x, y} = x ⇐⇒ |{i : c i {x, y} = x}| > m 2 ) if and only if for some c ∈ C and x ∈ X, |{y : c{x, y} = y}| = n − 1 2 .
We shall call this condition "imbalance." (b) for any pair (x, y) in X 2 , the weight of x over y for c is
That is, |{y : c{x, y} = x}| = |{y : c{x, y} = y}|, for every x in X. Gil Kalai further asked whether the number m can be given bounds in terms of n, and what is the result of demanding a "non-trivial majority," e.g. 51%. We shall consider loose bounds while addressing the general case, when voters are permitted to abstain.
To determine what symmetric sets of partial choice functions could produce an arbitrary outcome, we shall characterize the set of all possible outcomes of a symmetric set of choice functions, the "majority closure" maj-cl(C ). The symmetric set C satisfies this extension to McGarvey's theorem if and only if maj-cl(C ) = C. Definition 1.3. For C ⊆ C, let maj-cl(C ) be the set of d ∈ C such that, for some set of weights {r c ∈ [0, 1] Q : c ∈ C } with c∈C r c = 1,
Here and throughout this paper, [0, 1] Q refers to the rationals in the unit interval of the real line. Note that we cannot assume that maj-cl(maj-cl(C )) = maj-cl(C ), and in fact we shall see this is not true. We must show that each function d in the majority closure, thus defined, can in fact be the outcome of a finite collection of voters using choice functions in C ; this is Claim 2.6.
Shelah [1] gave a characterization of maj-cl(C ) for nonempty symmetric sets of full choice functions; there are just two cases. If some c ∈ C is unbalanced, then maj-cl(C ) = C; if every c ∈ C is balanced, then maj-cl(C ) is the set of all pseudo-balanced functions. The situation with possible abstention is more complicated; there are three nontrivial cases, see Main Claim 3.1. Unlike in Shelah [1] , it is possible to have nontrivial C for which maj-cl(C ) contains no directed cycles; this happens if and only if C is partisan (see Definitions 2.3 and 2.4).
Basic Definitions and Facts
In addition to the representations as relations, choice functions, or oriented graphs discussed above, we shall also find it convenient to map each choice function c to a sequence in [−1, 1] Q indexed by X 2 , the "probability sequence"
Let pr(C ) be {pr(c) : c ∈ C }, and pr(X) denote the set of all sequencest in
Q such that t x,y = −t y,x ; pr(X) contains pr(C). Definition 2.1. For a probability sequencet ∈ pr(X), (a)t is balanced if for each x ∈ X, y∈X t x,y = 0. (b) maj(t) is the c ∈ C such that c{x, y} = x ⇐⇒ t x,y > 0.
Note that maj and pr are mutually inverse functions from C to pr(C); c = maj(pr(c)) andt = pr(maj(t)) for all c ∈ C andt ∈ pr(C). The function maj is also defined on the much larger set pr(X), which it maps onto C. The reason for reusing the name "balanced" is clear:
If c ∈ C is a balanced choice function, then pr(c) is a balanced probability sequence. Ift ∈ pr(C) is a balanced probability sequence, then maj(t) is a balanced choice function.
Proof. Suppose c ∈ C is balanced. For every x ∈ X, y∈X W However, it is not the case that maj(t) is balanced for every balancedt ∈ pr(X). For instance, choose x, z ∈ X and define a sequencet which has t z,x = 1, t x,z = −1; for all y / ∈ {x, z}
and for all other pairs (u, v), t u,v = 0. One may check thatt is balanced, yet maj(t) has y∈X W x y (maj(t)) = n − 3 > 0 for any X with at least 4 elements. Definition 2.3. For a choice function c ∈ C, (a) c is partisan if there is nonempty W X such that c{x, y} = x ⇐⇒ x ∈ W and y / ∈ W.
(b) c is tiered if there is a partition {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k } of X such that c{x, y} = x if and only if x ∈ X i , y ∈ X j , and i > j. We say c is k-tiered where the partition has k sets. (So a partisan function is 2-tiered.) (c) c is chaotic if it is both unbalanced and nonpartisan.
We can now establish some straightforward results which allow us to describe the possible outcomes due to voters chosen from a given symmetric set more explicitly.
Claim 2.5. If C is a symmetric subset of C, then d is the strict simple majority outcome of some finite set {c 1 , . . . , c m } chosen from C if and only if
Proof. We have that d is the strict simple majority outcome if and only if Clearly, c∈C r c = 1, and, for each c ∈ C , 0 ≤ r c ≤ 1. Furthermore, 
so d is the simple majority relation of the c i .
Proof. Suppose d ∈ maj-cl(C ). Then there are r c per c ∈ C with c∈C r c = 1 and
Lett = c∈C r c pr(c) be a probability sequence in pr-cl(C ). Then
Then for some r c with c∈C r c = 1, d = maj c∈C r c pr(c) .
A Characterization
Main Claim 3.1. Given a symmetric C ⊆ C,
(ii) C is balanced but nontrivial ⇐⇒ maj-cl(C ) is the set of all pseudobalanced choice functions on X. (iii) C is partisan and nontrivial ⇐⇒ maj-cl(C ) is the set of all tiered choice functions on X. (iv) C is not balanced and not partisan ⇐⇒ maj-cl(C ) = C.
Proof. No nontrivial C is both balanced and partisan, so the sets {C ⊂ C : C is trivial}, {C ⊂ C : C is symmetric, nontrivial, and balanced}, {C ⊂ C : C is symmetric, nontrivial, and partisan}, and {C ⊆ C : C is symmetric, not balanced, and not partisan} partition the family of all symmetric subsets of C. Thus proving each forward implication in the claim will give the reverse implications.
i. If no-one in C makes any choices, no combination can have a majority choice.
ii. This is the content of Section 4, below.
iii. It is shown in Inada [8] (using different terminology) that if C is partisan and nontrivial then every element of maj-cl(C ) is a tiered choice function. We give an alternate proof. Suppose that C is partisan and d ∈ maj-cl(C ). Then there is a finite set {c 1 , . . . , c m } ⊆ C with d as the strict simple majority outcome. For each x ∈ X, let k x be the number of c i such that x is in the "winning" partite set. For any (x, y) ∈ X 2 , let k be the number of c i where x and y are both in the winning subset; the number of c i with c i {x, y} = x is k x − k, and the number with c i {x, y} = y is k y − k, so
Partition X into subsets for each value of k x ,
These subsets form the tiers, so d is a tiered function.
For the reverse inclusion, suppose d is an arbitrary tiered function with tiers {X 1 , . . . , X k }. Let c ∈ C . For each x ∈ X, let Γ x ⊂ Per(X) be all permutations holding x fixed and c x be a choice function in C with x in its winning subset. (If y is in the winning subset of c, c (x,y) will suffice for c x .) Now construct {c 1 , . . . , c m } by taking, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, each x ∈ X i , and each σ ∈ Γ x , i copies of c σ x . Suppose x ∈ X i , y ∈ X j , and i > j (so d{x, y} = x). Then for any z ∈ X i \ {x}, any z ∈ X j \ {y}, and any z in other tiers, x and y are chosen by equal numbers of {c for each σ ∈ Γ x , and j such functions c σ y for each σ ∈ Γ y . The number of permutations fixing x and the number fixing y are the same, |Γ x | = |Γ y |. The number of permutations fixing x and putting y in the losing subset and the number fixing y and putting x in the losing subset is the same, l. There are il functions which choose x over y, and jl which choose y over x; il > jl so the strict simple majority outcome of the c i chooses x. If i = j, then il = jl, so x and y tie in the majority outcome. Thus d is the strict simple majority outcome of {c 1 , . . . , c m } and d ∈ maj-cl(C ).
iv. If C is a chaotic set, the conclusion follows from Section 5, below. Otherwise, C is not balanced and not partisan, but not chaotic. In this case, C contains unbalanced functions which are all partisan, and nonpartisan functions which are all balanced. By symmetry, C contains a nontrivial balanced symmetric subset B and a nontrivial partisan symmetric subset P.
Let d ∈ C. Suppose b → a is any edge of d. For each z ∈ X \ {a, b}, by Claim 4.5 there is a voter population T z from B such that a beats z, z beats b, b beats a, and no other pairs are decided; moreover, the same number of voters, say m, choose the winner in each pair, and no dissenting votes occur. In the combination z T z , m voters choose a over each z, and each z over b. m(n − 2) voters choose b over a.
Let c ∈ P be a partisan function, and l be the size of the set of winning candidates under c. Let A ⊂ P be the set of permutations of c so that a is on the losing side, B ⊂ P be the permutations of c so that b is on the winning side, and C = A ∩ B-the permutations with b winning and a losing.
Any candidates besides a or b are tied over all the voters of A, B, or C, since each is selected in the winning set an equal number of times. Furthermore, a does not beat b in any choice function in A, B, or C. Now we seek to take appropriate numbers of copies of the sets A, B, and C so that, for some constant k, any z ∈ X \ {a, b} defeats a by k votes, and loses to b by k votes. Say we have k 0 copies of A, k 1 copies of B, and k 2 copies of C in a population D. Now for each z ∈ X \ {a, b},
So we solve k 0
l−1 , with coefficients not all zero. There are solutions
l−2 , the number of votes for b over z, or z over a, for any z ∈ X \ {a, b}. Now take the union of k copies of the population z T z , mk 0 copies of A, mk 1 copies of B, and mk 2 copies of C for our voter population. b defeats any z mk times among the partisan functions, and z defeats b km times among the balanced functions, so they tie; similarly, a and z tie. Thus we are left with b → a. The union of such populations for each edge in d yields d as the majority outcome.
Hence C ⊆ maj-cl(C ).
Balanced Choices
Definition 4.1. For a choice function c ∈ C, (a) c is triangular if for some {x, y, z} ∈ X 3 , c{x, y} = x, c{y, z} = y, c{z, x} = z, and for any {u, v} ⊂ {x, y, z}, {u, v} / ∈ dom c. We write c x,y,z for such c.
• No other pair {x, y} is in dom c.
We write c x1,...,x k for such c. (Triangular functions are a specific case of cyclic functions.) (c) Let pr bl be the set of all balancedt ∈ pr(X).
Note that if C is symmetric and c x,y,z ∈ C , then c u,v,w ∈ C for any {u, v, w} ∈ X 3 ; similarly for cyclic functions. Claim 4.2. If a choice function c = maj(t) for somet ∈ pr bl , then c is pseudobalanced.
Proof. Assume c = maj(t) for somet ∈ pr bl . Let x → y be any edge of Tor(c); then t x,y > 0. Suppose x → y is in no directed cycle. Let Y be the set of z ∈ X with a winning chain to x, i.e.
Let Y = X \ Y . Note that y ∈ Y and x ∈ Y , so Y and Y partition X into nonempty sets. Suppose z ∈ Y and v ∈ Y . Say z, z 1 , . . . , z k is a winning chain from z to x. If t z,v < 0, then v, z, z 1 , . . . , z k forms a winning chain from v to x. If v is y, the chain forms a directed cycle with the edge x → y and we are done.
If v = y, this contradicts that v / ∈ Y . So we assume that t z,v ≥ 0. Sincet is balanced, r u +r u = 0, so
We have seen that the first summand is positive, so the second summand is negative. But it is zero because for each pair
This is a contradiction; so x → y must be in some directed cycle. Soū is a balanced probability sequence.
Claim 4.4. If C ⊂ C is symmetric, balanced, and nontrivial, then every d ∈ maj-cl(C ) is pseudo-balanced.
Proof. By Claim 2.2, everyt ∈ pr(C ) is balanced. So by Claim 4.3, the convex hull pr-cl(C ) is contained in pr bl . Any d ∈ maj-cl(C ) is maj(t) for somet ∈ pr-cl(C ), by Claim 2.7, hence is pseudo-balanced, by Claim 4.2.
For the reverse inclusion, that every pseudo-balanced function is in the majority closure, we shall consider the graph interpretation. First we shall show that every triangular function is in the majority closure of a balanced symmetric set.
Claim 4.5. If C ⊂ C is symmetric, balanced, and nontrivial, then for any {x, y, z} ∈ X 3 , the triangular function c x,y,z ∈ maj-cl(C ). Moreover, there is a voter population generating c x,y,z such that the same number of votes choose x over y, y over z, or z over x, and there are no opposing votes in any of these cases. where σ ∈ Per(X) takes x 1 to x, x 2 to y, and x 3 to z. Now consider the cycle in Tor(c), so x 1 = x, x 2 = y, and x 3 = z. We define Let Γ x,y,z ⊂ Per(X) be the permutations fixing x, y, and z, and take {c σ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, σ ∈ Γ x,y,z } as our finite set of voters. We claim the majority outcome of this set is c x,y,z . If u, v ∈ X \ {x, y, z}, then equal numbers of permutations σ ∈ Γ x,y,z have c σ i {u, v} = u and c σ i {u, v} = v, so they are tied. If u is among {x, y, z} and v is not, then there are some out-edges from u in Tor(c). Since c is balanced, there are an equal number of in-edges to u. For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, v will occupy the inedges which are not on the cycle in as many permutations of c i as permutations where it occupies out-edges which are not on the cycle. If m = 3, then v occupies no edges on the cycle. Otherwise, v occupies an out-edge from u along the cycle only in
• c σ 1 , for some set of σ ∈ Γ x,y,z , if u = z; then v occupies an in-edge to z on the cycle in c 3 for an equal number of permutations.
• c σ 2 , for some set of σ ∈ Γ x,y,z , if u = x; then v occupies an in-edge to x on the cycle in c 1 for an equal number of permutations. • c The collection {c σ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, σ ∈ Γ x,y,z } is the voter population in the claim. There are no opposing votes between x, y, or z because such a vote would imply an edge between two vertices of the cycle which is not itself on the cycle, contradicting our choice of the smallest cycle. Claim 4.6. If C ⊆ C and c x,y,z ∈ maj-cl(C ) for any {x, y, z} ∈ X 3 , then for any k ≥ 3 and {x 1 , . . . ,
Proof. If k = 3, we have c x1,x2,x3 ∈ maj-cl(C ) by assumption. Suppose that 3 < k ≤ n and for any k−1 distinct candidates {x 1 , . . . , x k−1 } ⊂ X we have c x1,...,x k−1 ∈ maj-cl(C ). Say {c 1 , . . . , c m0 } is a set of m 0 voters with c x1,...,x k−1 as their strict simple majority outcome. Let
(c i ).
Then l 0 > 0 since c x1,...,x k−1 {x 1 , x k−1 } = x k−1 . By hypothesis c x1,x k−1 ,x k ∈ maj-cl(C ). Say {c 1 , . . . , c m1 } is a set of m 1 voters with c x1,x k−1 ,x k as their strict simple majority outcome. Let
Like l 0 , l 1 is a positive integer. Let L = lcm(l 0 , l 1 ), and take . , x k−1 ) which are not adjacent are tied among the c i and among the c i . Any point on the cycle besides x 1 or x k−1 is also tied with x k among the c i and among the c i . Any pair of consecutive points (x i , x j ) on the cycle, besides (x k−1 , x 1 ), are tied among the c i , but the majority of the c i pick x i . So d{x i , x j } = x i . x k−1 and x k tie among the c i , but the majority of the c i pick
The left hand side is equal to
Thus {x 1 , x k−1 } / ∈ dom d, and d{x i , x j } = x i if and only if j ≡ i + 1 mod k, so d = c x1,...,x k ∈ maj-cl(C ). By induction on k, any cyclic choice function on X is in maj-cl(C ). 
These are the valence pairs, with winners on the right in V −1 , ties in V 0 , winners on the left in V 1 , and with 1 subtracted from the valence of the winner. In fact,
These are the convex hulls of the "winning" valence pairs, together with ties, requiring some contribution from a non-tied pair. In this case, every candidate has the same valence, which would mean that c is balanced; a contradiction. Furthermore, every candidate with the high valence must defeat everyone of the low valence, since they cannot be tied. This is the definition of a partisan function.
Conversely, suppose that c is partisan. Then two elements are tied only if they are both in the winning subset, or both in the losing subset; in either case, they have the same valence, so V 0 (c) is contained in the line y = x. V 1 (c) is the single point (val c (w) − 1, val c (v) + 1) for any w in the winning subset and v in the losing subset. Naturally, this point is contained in a line parallel to y = x. Thus all other valences are at most −1, so the average valence is strictly smaller than the average of val c (v 1 ) and val c (v 2 ), at most 0. This is a contradiction, since the average valence is always 0. Therefore, the sum of the valence pair for v 1 and v 2 in any V (c) satisfies y + x > 0. If the pair is in V 1 (c), it is in V * (c). If it is in V −1 (c), then its reflection in V 1 (c) (hence in V * (c)) still satisfies x + y > 0. If it is in V 0 (c), then points arbitrarily close to the pair, along any line to a point of V 1 (c), are in V * (c). Some of these points are above y = −x. Let u 1 and u 2 be two candidates in X having the smallest valences with c. By imbalance, val c (u 1 ) < 0. Suppose val c (u 1 ) + val c (u 2 ) ≥ 0. Then the average of these two valences is at least 0, and the average over all candidates is larger; it is strictly larger, since val c (v 1 ) > 0 figures in the average. This is a contradiction, so the sum of the valence pair for u 1 and u 2 in any V (c) satisfies y + x < 0. If this pair is in V −1 (c), then its reflection in V 1 (c) still satisfies x + y < 0. Otherwise it is in V * (c), or arbitrarily close points are in V * (c).
To establish that every choice function is in the majority closure of a chaotic symmetric set, we shall first establish that some c therein satisfies a rather abstruse condition which we'll call "valence-imbalance." 
Note that (0, 0) ∈ V * (c) implies that c is valence-unbalanced.
Claim 5.6. Ifū is strictly between two points of conv (V 1 (c)) on a line segment not parallel to y = x, then the nearest point on y = x toū is of the form
;w is the nearest point toū on y = x. There arep 0 = (a 0 , b 0 ) andp 1 = (a 1 , b 1 ) in conv (V 1 (c)) so thatū is strictly betweenp 0 andp 1 . If the line segment Λ betweenp 0 andp 1 is perpendicular to y = x, then eitherw is in Λ, and the assertion holds, orw is betweenp 1 and the reflection ofp 0 ,q 0 = (b 0 , a 0 ). So for some r −1 and r 1 , r −1q0 + r 1p1 = w = If Λ is not perpendicular to the line y = x, then we may choose the points p 0 andp 1 so that a 0 + b 0 < 2a + b < a 1 + b 1 , and on the same side of y = x. The reflection of Λ over y = x lies on a line; call it L. Then L containsv = (a + b, a), q 0 = (b 0 , a 0 ), andq 1 = (b 1 , a 1 ), all in conv (V −1 (c)); sov lies strictly betweenq 0 andq 1 within conv (V −1 (c)).
Consider the sequenceū
for n ≥ 1, approachingū as n → ∞. For each n, letv n be the intersection of the line throughū n andw with the line L. (If necessary, define thev n only for n > j, if the line fromū j throughw is parallel to L; at most one such j can exist.) As n → ∞,v n approachesv. So for some N ∈ N and all n ≥ N ,v n is in the interval (q 0 , hence in V * (c), so c is valence-unbalanced. Ifv is not on y = x, then it has a reflection u ∈ V −1 (c). The set conv{v,ū,w} contains an open disc about (0, 0). Since there are points in conv (V 0 (c)) arbitrarily close tow on the line between (k 0 , k 1 ) and (k 1 , k 0 ), we may choose (k 0 , k 1 ) so k 0 = k 1 and (0, 0) ∈ conv{v,ū, (k 0 , k 1 )}.
Suppose c is valence-balanced. Sayv is (v 0 , v 1 ). Then
= k 1 , a contradiction. Therefore c is valence-unbalanced. Then c is partisan by Claim 5.3, contradicting that c is chaotic.
Case 4. V 0 (c) is contained in y = x, conv (V 1 (c)) contains a line segment not parallel to y = x, and V 1 (c) has points on either side of y = −x.
Then there is a point of y = −x strictly between two points of conv (V 1 (c)) such that the line segment between them is not parallel to y = x. By Claim 5.6, (0, 0) = r −1v−1 + r 1v1 wherev ∈ conv (V (c)), r ∈ [0, 1] Q , r −1 + r 1 = 1, but r −1 = r 1 , i.e. c is valence-unbalanced. 
. Let σ v be a permutation taking u v to x and w v to y, i.e.
Let Γ x,y be all the permutations of X which fix x and y, and let
Of course, the sum of the coefficients is
Since r , s v , and
Consider t x,y . Each τ fixes x and y, so
Thus
Since r −1 = r 1 , t x,y = 0.
Consider t x,u where u / ∈ {x, y}.
u * is never u v or w v . For a given andv, u * varies equally over all elements of X besides {u v , w v }, so
This follows from the fact that, for each u * ∈ X \ {u v w v }, there are |Γ x,y,u | permutations τ which take u to u * . For any u, W Recall that the u v were chosen so that val c (u v ) − is the first coordinate of v. Recall also that the r , s v , and valence pairsv were chosen so Similarly, t y,u = 0 for all u / ∈ {x, y}. Consider t u,w with neither u nor w in {x, y}. Then
where
). But τ −1 (u) and τ −1 (w) are never x or y, so u * is never u v and w * is never w v . As τ varies, u * and w * vary equally over all members of X except u v and w v , so c{u * , w * } = u * just as often as c{u * , w * } = w * . Thus 
Bounds
We shall consider the loose upper bounds, implied by the preceding proofs, on the necessary number of voters from a symmetric set to yield an arbitrary function in its majority closure, in terms of n. There is no doubt that much tighter bounds could be obtained.
Trivial
0 functions suffice to obtain no outcome.
Balanced
In order to create a triangular function from a chosen function c, (n − 3)! permutations of the rest of the set were used. These were repeated 3 times, to establish each pair of edges in the triangle.
An arbitrary pseudo-balanced function has each edge in a directed cycle, so one cycle per edge suffices; so we have at most cycles. Each is constructed with two fewer triangles than the number of nodes it contains. This is at most n − 2, if some cycle contains every node. So all together we have
Partisan There are at most n tiers in an arbitrary tiered function, each with at most n elements (of course, no function meets both conditions.) For each such element x, we take functions for each permutation holding x fixed; there are (n − 1)! such. So we have n n(n − 1)! = n n! as an upper bound. Since everything on the right hand side is an integer, the only denominator introduced is the determinant of the 3 by 3 matrix, bd − ac − ad + bc + a 2 − b 2 . Since each of a, b, c, d is an integer between −n and n, this is at most 6n 2 . In the cases involving four points, such as Case 1 or Case 5, an additional constraint is needed, which is not a consequence of the other three. In Case 1, use r 1 +r 2 +r 3 +r 4 = 1, a 1 r 1 +a 2 r 2 +a 3 r 3 +a 4 r 4 = 0, b 1 r 1 +b 2 r 2 +b 3 r 3 +b 4 r 4 = 0, and add b 3 r 3 + b 4 r 4 = −a 3 r 3 − a 4 r 4 , since the pointsv and (k 0 , −k 0 ) were linear combinations of two valence pairs on the line y = −x. The lowest common denominator is at most the determinant of 3 . In Case 5, note that the pointv between two points of V 1 (c) is arbitrary; we can choose any point between the two. Between any two pairs of integers on which do not lie on a line perpendicular to y = x, we can choose a point whose projection on y = x is of the form gives a determinant k(2a 2 − b 2 − ab − ac + bd + bc − ad) at most 8n 3 ; we must multiply by 4 because of the fraction in the column vector, giving 32n
3 . This is the largest denominator of the six possible linear combinations in Claim 5.7.
Thus our upper bound is L(n − 2)! n 2 − n 2 < 16 n 3 n(n − 1)(n − 2)! = 16 n 3 n!.
